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I. INTRODUCTION
From March 2020, the United States’ public health law universe was 
dramatically transformed by measures taken to combat the new emerging 
respiratory virus, SARS-CoV-2, which causes the disease COVID-19.1 
The virus emerged in December 2019, and cases arrived in the United States
* © 2020 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss.  LL.B., Ph.D.; Professor of Law, James Edgar
Hervey Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of Law. 
** © 2020 Madeline Thomas.  J.D. Candidate 2022, University of California, Hastings 
College of Law.  We are grateful to Raena Waldman for excellent research assistance. 
1. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Eric A. Friedman & Sarah A. Wetter, Responding to
Covid-19: How to Navigate a Public Health Emergency Legally and Ethically, HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2020, at 8, 8–12, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ 
hast.1090 [https://perma.cc/MLT7-67BM]. 
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as early as January 2020; though federal public health acted earlier,2 
widespread public health measures were not taken until March 2020.3 
The San Francisco Bay Area’s counties were the first to issue widespread
shelter-in-place orders, operative from March 17, 2020.4  By March 30,
2020, over half the states issued shelter-in-place or stay-at-home orders.5 
Many of these state and local measures have dramatic impacts on individuals’ 
freedom and daily lives.  Balancing public health and rights in this situation 
is not easy, and courts have an important, difficult role to play.6 
Predictably, legal challenges to these broad measures have already been 
filed.7  Among them were a variety of challenges claiming that stay-at-home 
orders that apply to religious gatherings violate the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of the free exercise of religion.8 This Article addresses such claims. 
This Article is unlikely to be published before the end of the current chapter
of stay-at-home orders and subsequent challenges.  But the analysis is still 
relevant: until the emergence of a COVID-19 vaccine—which will take some
time—new waves of the disease could lead to additional restrictive measures.9 
2. Daniel B. Jernigan, Update: Public Health Response to the Coronavirus Disease
2019 Outbreak–United States, February 24, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 216, 216–18 (2020).  As of February 28, 2020, the response to the pandemic was still 
at the level of investigation and response to individual cases; the widespread social distancing 
measures came later.  See id. 
 3. See infra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
4. Erin Allday, Bay Area Orders ‘Shelter in Place,’ Only Essential Businesses Open 
in 6 Counties, S.F. CHRONICLE (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/local-politics/
article/Bay-Area-must-shelter-in-place-Only-15135014.php [https://perma.cc/C9RQ-USRZ].
Allday refers to the Bay Area order as a “shelter in place order.”  Id. Later orders used the 
language “stay-at-home.”  See, e.g., sources cited infra note 5.  Although our Article mentions
both terms, in part because of the title the Bay Area counties used, “stay-at-home” orders 
will be used going forward for consistency.
5. List: The 27 States that Now Have Stay-at-Home Coronavirus Orders, MERCURY 
NEWS (Mar. 29, 2020, 1:07 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/29/coronavirus-
list-the-27-states-that-now-have-stay-at-home-orders/ [https://perma.cc/9BJU-3GCP]; Alicia
Lee, These States Have Implemented Stay-at-Home Orders. Here’s What that Means for
You, CNN (Apr. 7, 2020, 5:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/23/us/coronavirus-
which-states-stay-at-home-order-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/8AYJ-AJPX].
6. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Lindsay F. Wiley, Governmental Public Health
Powers During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Stay-at-Home Orders, Business Closures, and 
Travel Restrictions, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2137, 2137–38 (2020). 




8. See, e.g., Complaint, Binford v. Sununu, No. 217-2020-CV-00152 (N.H. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civil/Sununu/031720Sununu-
complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/P897-J2VN].
9. See Sam Meredith, Harvard Researchers Warn Social-Distancing Measures
May Need to Remain in Place into 2022, CNBC (Apr. 15, 2020, 7:15 AM), https:// 
948
REISS&THOMAS_57-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2020 8:18 PM     












   
 
   
  




[VOL. 57:  947, 2020] Stay-At-Home Orders and Religious Freedom 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Further, COVID-19 is unlikely to be the only infectious disease threat the 
United States faces.  We have seen other threats of pandemic—for example, 
SARS in 2003,10 luckily controlled, H1N1 in 2009,11 and MERS in 2012.12 
There is every reason to expect future pandemics, even if we cannot anticipate 
their shape or breadth, or other public health threats.  COVID-19’s stay-
at-home orders offer a precedent that may be used in future pandemics; 
the limits imposed by the First Amendment are, therefore, worth exploring. 
There are two parts to that discussion.  The more obvious one is the tension 
between the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and stay-at-home 
orders that seek to limit religious gatherings.  But another, more nuanced
tension is between the Establishment Clause and stay-at-home orders that
explicitly exempt churches.
The challenge in exploring the Free Exercise Clause is two-fold.  First, 
changes to the composition of the Supreme Court raise the possibility that 
current First Amendment jurisprudence may change in the near future13— 
lower courts decisions that do not fit the current jurisprudence may end 
up adopted as an alternative view, rather than seen as an error.  Specifically, 
current jurisprudence uses the framework of Employment Division v. 
Smith, and that framework may be modified or rejected by the Supreme 
Court in the near future—or not.14  This Article identifies potential changes
to this jurisprudence—but also points out that such change is uncertain—
and provides a coherent approach under existing jurisprudence.  Second, 
the current approach federal courts take may not fit comfortably in states 
www.cnbc.com/2020/04/15/coronavirus-study-warns-social-distancing-may-need-to-stay-
until-2022.html [https://perma.cc/HK3W-X37Y].
10. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FACT SHEET: BASIC 
INFORMATION ABOUT SARS 1 (2004), https://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/fs-SARS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2CLQ-V6MW].
11. See 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 virus), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html 
[https://perma.cc/N8QK-CY2H] (last reviewed June 11, 2019). 
12. See About MERS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/XZ3K-E6X9] (last 
updated Aug. 2, 2019).
13. See Adam Liptak, John Roberts Was Already Chief Justice. But Now It’s His Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/john-roberts-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/659M-85K6].
14. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79, 882 (1990). 
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with a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).15  Taking that into 
account, this Article suggests prescriptions that can be relevant both to 
states following the federal approach to the Free Exercise Clause and for 
states that adopted strict scrutiny through RFRAs. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II describes the challenges
COVID-19 poses, states’ responses, and resulting lawsuits.  Among other
things, it points out that inevitably stay-at-home orders draw some lines 
and allow some activities.  Part III explains the pre-existing jurisprudence 
regarding the Free Exercise Clause, and where we are in terms of the law.
It suggests that under Smith, states have considerable leeway to enforce
orders that are generally aimed at gatherings against religiously-motivated
gatherings as well, even if the state allows other activities that are not 
characterized by large gatherings in closed spaces.  It addresses—and rejects— 
a view that Smith is inapplicable if a law provides any exceptions, but 
highlights that there are circumstances under which strict scrutiny should
apply to stay-at-home orders. It also describes the legal situation in states
with a RFRA. Part IV critically analyzes the jurisprudence thus far and 
suggests general guidance for moving forward from two perspectives: 
how states should write stay-at-home orders to comply with the legal 
protections of religious freedom, and how courts should approach stay-at-
home orders on review.  Lastly, Part V addresses whether stay-at-home
orders that exempt churches run afoul of separation of church and state,
and concludes that generally, they do not. 
II. COVID-19 AND STAY-AT-HOME ORDERS
In response to COVID-19, the vast majority of states passed stay-at-
home orders.  As of April 23, 2020, forty-two states have issued a stay-at-
home order, and within three of the states that have not—Oklahoma, Utah, 
and Wyoming—several localities have issued stay-at-home orders.16  Only
five states—North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Arkansas 
—have no order, state-wide or otherwise.17  The content of these orders
varies locally.  Relevant to this paper, several states expressly exempt 
15. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/DL37-VJ7G].
16. Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu & Vanessa Swales, See Which States and Cities Have 
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religious services from the order.18  Others do not. All of them allow some 
activities to continue. 
Shortly after the start of stay-at-home orders, several lawsuits challenged
the application of stay-at-home orders to religious events and gatherings; 
some resulted in temporary stays of the orders, while others were dismissed 
or had temporary orders denied.  On March 17, 2020, three New Hampshire
residents—David Binford, Holly Beene, and Eric Couture—sued Governor 
Sununu of New Hampshire for issuing an emergency order on March 16.19 
The complaint had several arguments, both statutory and constitutional, 
but among the arguments David Binford claimed that “The decree by the 
governor of New Hampshire prohibits him being able to attend religious 
services and right to practice his religion due to the fact that more than 50
people attend.”20  Similarly, the complaint alleged that “Plaintiff Eric Couture 
attends services 3 times a week at Bible Baptist church in Nashua and teaches 
Sunday school apologetics to the teens at his church.  The order in question 
violates his right to peacefully attend and worship God with other church 
members and violates his conscience to do so.”21 
The New Hampshire executive order in question says:
In accordance with CDC guidelines, the following activities are hereby prohibited 
within the State of New Hampshire:
Scheduled gatherings of 50 people or more for social, spiritual and recreational
activities, including but not limited to, community, civic, public, leisure, faith-
based, or sporting events; parades; concerts; festivals; conventions; fundraisers; 
and similar activities. This prohibition does not apply to the General Court or to
the day-to-day operations of businesses.22 
The order clearly aims to be expansive and cover most gatherings, regardless 
of the goal. Even though it does mention “faith-based activities,” it is not 
singling out religious gatherings, as its other sections place restrictions on, 
18. See, e.g., Mike Cason, Gov. Kay Ivey Issues Stay-at-Home Order Effective 
Saturday, AL.COM (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.al.com/news/2020/04/gov-kay-ivey-to-
give-update-on-coronavirus-response.html [https://perma.cc/7F47-KXRP].
19. Complaint at 1, Binford v. Sununu, No. 217-2020-CV-00152 (N.H. Super. Ct.
Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civil/Sununu/031720Sununu-
complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB7L-NL2V].
20. Id. at 3. 
21. Id.













   
   
 
  
    
 
     
  
  
   
 
 
    
   
 
    
 
      
  
     
 
for example, restaurants.23 New York’s order on the topic is even more 
general: it prohibited gatherings, without mentioning religious gatherings, 
simply saying, “Non-essential gatherings of individuals of any size for 
any reason (e.g. parties, celebrations or other social events) are canceled 
or postponed at this time.”24  Georgia’s order also directed that “no business, 
establishment, corporation, non-profit corporation, organization, or county or 
municipal government shall allow more than ten (10) persons to be gathered 
at a single location if such gathering requires persons to stand or to be 
seated within six (6) feet of any other person.”25  An initial Florida order 
forbade all “social or recreational gatherings of 10 or more people.”26 
All of these orders had exceptions to staying at home, including, for 
example, going to grocery stores.27 
Several outbreaks centered on religious services highlighted the reason 
for including religious services in the closures.  For example, a church service
in Arkansas attended by ninety-two people led to an outbreak of thirty-
five cases in churchgoers, another twenty-six in the community, and four 
deaths, three of which were churchgoers.28  Other outbreaks were also traced 
to churches, though none as large or lethal.29  As we learn more about
23. See id. (“Food and beverage sales are restricted to carry-out, delivery, curbside
pick-up, and drive-through only, to the extent permitted by current law.  No onsite consumption 
is permitted, and all onsite consumption areas in restaurants, diners, bars, saloons, private 
clubs, or any other establishment that offers food and beverages for sale shall be closed to 
customers.”). 
24. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/
no-20210-continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating-disaster-
emergency [https://perma.cc/A54Z-UBRM] (order has since been renewed).
25. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/
executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/3RXC-KUK8].
The executive order is described as “[l]imiting large gatherings statewide, ordering ‘shelter 
in place’ for specific populations, and closing bars and nightclubs in Georgia for fourteen
days.” 2020 Executive Orders, GOVERNOR BRIAN P. KEMP: OFF. GOVERNOR, https://gov. 
georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/
GFP2-H7N8].
26. Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-83 (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/
uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-83.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NWZ-5CZC].
27. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.0 (Apr. 2, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/
executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/3RXC-KUK8]
(permitting the obtaining of necessary supplies, engaging in essential health and safety 
activities, and engaging in socially distanced outdoor exercise).
28. Allison James et al., High COVID-19 Attack Rate Among Attendees at Events
at a Church–Arkansas, March 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 632, 633 
(May 19, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6920e2-H.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D42Y-7NMA].
29. See, e.g., Stephanie Becker, At Least 70 People Infected with Coronavirus Linked
to a Single Church in California, Health Officials Say, CNN (Apr. 4, 2020, 11:39 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/03/us/sacramento-county-church-covid-19-outbreak/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/4U3E-NP6X]; Richard Burkard, Church at Center of COVID-19
952
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COVID-19, several factors that clearly increase risk are large gatherings, 
being indoors, and lengthy contact—conversely, smaller groups, being 
outdoors, and limited duration contacts are less risky.30  These factors
clearly apply to many religious gatherings—just as they apply to large 
university classes, concerts, theatre, sport events, and other venues. 
In spite of this risk, some states expressly exempted religious gatherings
from their restrictions. Ohio’s stay-at-home order, after prohibiting “[a]ll 
public and private gathering of any number of people occurring outside a 
single household and connected property,” specified that “[t]his Section
does not apply to religious facilities, entities and groups and religious 
gatherings.”31  Other states allowed at least some religious services— 
for example, Alabama allowed them for less than ten people or as drive-
through services.32  
As mentioned, several lawsuits have been filed against stay-at-home 
orders claiming they violate the First Amendment’s freedom of religion 
guarantee. We listed every decision we could find online in a Google 
spreadsheet.33 We are not aware of any lawsuits against stay-at-home orders
exempting churches. 
Outbreak Responds, MESSENGER (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.the-messenger.com/news/
local/article_59dcb9b2-063a-56fe-a89a-e72ee157483f.html [https://perma.cc/FDP6-3G3A];
Coronavirus Outbreaks Reported at Some Churches with In-Person Services, FOX 8 (May,
21, 2020, 11:27 AM), https://www.fox8live.com/2020/05/21/coronavirus-outbreaks-reported-
some-churches-with-in-person-services/ [https://perma.cc/YA2B-WH9C].
30. Daniela Hernandez, Sarah Toy & Betsy McKay, How Exactly Do You Catch




31. Ohio Dep’t of Health, Director’s Stay Safe Ohio Order (Apr. 30, 2020), https:// 
coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/publicorders/Directors-Stay-Safe-Ohio-Order.pdf? [https://perma.cc/
JSP5-J8YU]. 
32. Ala. Dep’t of Health, Order of the State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public 
Gatherings Due to Risk of Infection by COVID-19 (Apr. 3, 2020), https://governor.alabama.
gov/assets/2020/04/Final-Statewide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK32-Q3KC].
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The strength of claims challenging stay-at-home orders under the First
Amendment depends on two things.  First, the facts of the case, including 
the content of the challenged order and the practices sought or found in 
violation.  Second, the standard used to evaluate the order.  The latter, in 
turn, also depends on several things.
The current federal jurisprudence standard for assessing when a religious
exemption is required is Employment Division v. Smith, under which states
do not have to provide religious exemptions when they enact a law that is 
neutral on its face and of general applicability.34  Under Smith, as long as
the law does not target religion and is not motivated by hostility to religion, 
it can apply even if it burdens religion.35 Smith’s approach to the First 
Amendment was a change from previous jurisprudence and was not without 
its critics at the time.36  Nonetheless, there are several reasons to see Smith
as difficult to completely overturn, even in the face of recently decided 
cases suggesting a potentially increased sympathy for protecting religious 
views by a majority of Supreme Court Justices.37 Smith was written by
Justice Scalia, a leading conservative.38  The basis for Smith was, among
other things, concern that any law would be vulnerable if any person’s 
interpretation of religion justified waivers of laws that person claimed 
religious objection to—with the only barrier being a subjective sincerity
determination—and the potential expansion of the doctrine in ways that 
undermine public policy.39  These concerns can appeal even to those with 
strong religious views. 
The Supreme Court limited Congress’s attempts to overturn Smith by
the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, leaving states free,
from a constitutional standpoint, to pass general laws affecting religion 
 34. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
35. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–
32 (1993) (“[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice . . . [but a] law failing to satisfy these requirements must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance 
that interest.” (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); see also Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–32 (2018) (providing 
additional precedent). 
36. See Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters 
the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1431–33 (1990).  
37. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 167–71 
(2014); William P. Marshall, Extricating the Religious Exemption Debate from the Culture 
Wars, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 74–77 (2018). 
38. Marshall, supra note 37, at 68. 
39. See id. at 69–72. 
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without a religious exemption.40  But shortly after Smith, in Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah in 1993, the Court drew 
one line: it ruled that laws that are not neutral and generally applicable 
will still be held to strict scrutiny.41  In Lukumi, the City of Hialeah, Florida
enacted a set of ordinances clearly aimed at stopping a church belonging to 
the Santeria religion from engaging in ritual animal sacrifice.42  Although 
the language of the ordinances was neutral, the Court found from the 
record and the city’s prior resolutions that their clear objective was to 
prevent ritual sacrifice by this specific church, and therefore, the ordinances 
were not neutral: they were targeting a single church’s unique religious 
practice.43  The natural reading of Lukumi on its facts is that laws or 
ordinances motivated by hostility to religion are subject to strict scrutiny, 
even if they are neutral on their face.44  
That is not, however, the only available interpretation. In FOP Newark
Lodge 12 v. City of Newark, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
—including current Supreme Court Justice Alito, then a circuit judge—
ruled that Smith does not to apply to cases where the statute in question 
included individualized exceptions on secular grounds, finding that the
Court in Lukumi held just that—if there are secular exceptions to the
statute, the lack of religious exception would be subject to strict scrutiny.45 
That interpretation has not been adopted by the Supreme Court, and was 
rejected expressly by several federal courts.46  It was, however, adopted
by some lower courts, including subsequent Third Circuit decisions.47  It
40. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 534–36 (1997); see Matthew A. 
Brown, Coronavirus and Church Closures: Will the Covid-19 Gathering Bans Survive Free 
Exercise Challenges? 5–6 (Apr. 21, 2020) (unpublished comment), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3580135 [https://perma.cc/6M2C-S5JP].
41. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531– 
32 (1993).
42. Id. at 524–28. 
43. Id. at 533–36. 
44. Id. at 534–36. 
45. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359, 364–66 (3d Cir. 1999). 
46. E.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 427 F.3d 775, 784
(10th Cir. 2005); Brock v. Boozman, No. 4:01CV00760 SWW, 2002 WL 1972086, at *8 
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2002); Booth v. Maryland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398 (D. Md. 2002). 
47. See, e.g., Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206–09, 212 (3d Cir.
2004); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 167–72 (3d Cir. 2002); 
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F. Supp. 3d 960 (S.D. Io
2019); Cunningham v. City of Shreveport, 407 F. Supp. 3d 595, 605, 607–08 (W.D. L















   
 
      
  
      
  
        
   
    
 
 












was also reiterated by Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence in Masterpiece
Cakeshop.48 In one article it was suggested as a potential alternative if the 
Court decides to limit, but not overrule, Smith.49 
We find this approach unconvincing.  First, it is not well grounded in
Smith. Smith did distinguish Sherbert v. Verner, on the ground that the 
standard in Sherbert required individual assessment—the standard was
that an individual is not eligible for unemployment benefits if “without
good cause” the individual quit work.50  That is not quite the same as having
generalized, broad exemptions.  Even more importantly, that language was 
followed by language that suggested a complete overturning of Sherbert, 
and indeed, following decisions interpreted Smith as similarly abandoning 
Sherbert.51  The Court said: 
We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with
the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. 
The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, “cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s
spiritual development.” . . . To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State’s interest is “compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, “to become
a law unto himself,” . . . —contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense.52 
The interpretation fits even less comfortably with Lukumi. The reference 
to exceptions in Lukumi was not to argue that Smith is inapplicable where 
other exceptions exist; rather, the Court merely pointed out that the number 
and extent of exceptions left the ordinances applicable only to the Church 
of Lukumi Babalu, showing that hostility to the Santerian religion was the 
city’s true motivation.53 
Further, practically all laws have some exceptions.  Smith was about as 
close to a law without exception as you get: it was a general policy not to
v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:07–CV–1152–RLH–LRL, 2008 WL 3211279, at 
*4 (D. Nev. Aug. 6, 2008). 
48. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1737 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
49. See Brown, supra note 40, at 16–17. 
50. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990) (distinguishing Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
51. Paul S. Zilberfein, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith: The Erosion of Religious Liberty, 12 PACE L. REV. 403, 427–28 (1992). 
52. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (citations omitted) (first quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988); then quoting Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). 
53. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534– 
35 (1993). 
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use illegal drugs or alcohol by counselors.54  Even there, however, there
was a line between drugs defined as illegal and those that were not.  And 
the examples positively cited in Smith did not fall into that category—for 
example, United States v. Lee addressed refusal to pay social security tax, 
and there were other exceptions from that.55  In Brock v. Boozman, the 
court suggested that exemptions are a problem if they are adopted because 
of a value judgment in favor of a secular motivation, and against a religious 
one.56  Exemptions that are in line with the general purpose of the act, and 
do not make a value judgment preferring secular motivations over religious 
ones, are not a problem.57  We believe this offers a reasonable interpretation 
of FOP, and preserves the core of Smith while preventing hidden discrimination 
against religious values. We would say that laws that draw lines based on 
general, reasonable, neutral factors are not less neutral if they have some 
broad exemptions that fit such general criteria.  We realize that this may allow 
the policy maker to tailor measures to disguise hostility to religion under 
a façade of neutrality, but—as in Lukumi—expect such deliberate efforts 
to leave traces that can be demonstrated, and if that is the situation, Smith 
would not apply.  There is no good basis to see most state stay-at-home orders 
that way—as we point out, if anything, some lean the other way.  Smith allows 
neutral lines to be drawn, though—as we discuss below—there are limits 
to those lines. 
Reflecting this, in a recent set of decisions examining claims that removing 
nonmedical exemptions from school immunization mandates violates the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, several courts concluded
that the requirements are subject to Smith and constitutionally valid—
even though these courts make clear distinctions elsewhere.58 
54. See Zilberfein, supra note 51, at 424–25. 
55. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–62 (1982). 
56. Brock v. Boozman, No. 4:01CV00760 SWW, 2002 WL 1972086, at *7–8 (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 12, 2002). 
57. Id.
 58. See, e.g., Brown v. Smith, 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 218, 224–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); 
Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1086 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2016); Love v. State 
Dep’t of Educ., 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); F.F. ex rel. Y.F. v. New 
York, 108 N.Y.S.3d 761, 772–73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Litigating
Alternative Facts: School Vaccine Mandates in the Courts, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 
240–43 (2018). Smith was not the only relevant law, and these cases may stand even if 
Smith is overturned.  School mandates jurisprudence stands on more than Smith. See Reiss, 
supra, at 240–43. 
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Supreme Court Justices raised questions about the continuing viability 
of Smith, and a case currently before the Supreme Court may lead the Court 
to reexamine Smith.59  However, recent Supreme Court cases that ended 
with favorable outcomes for those challenging policies that allegedly interfered 
with their religion were carefully and intentionally decided on narrow grounds.  
The decisions ultimately reaffirmed—rather than overturned—Smith, 
suggesting that it is far from clear that Smith will be fully overturned.
The first of these cases was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, in which the Court 
found that requiring privately held corporations, acting as employers, to 
cover certain contraceptives for their employees violated the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).60  Importantly, the decision
interpreted the case under the RFRA—rather than the First Amendment—
and the majority explicitly reiterated that Smith was the Court’s interpretation 
61 of the First Amendment.
In the later Masterpiece Cakeshop case, a majority of the Court overturned 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s sanction against a baker who
refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.62  Here, too, the
Supreme Court did not overturn Smith, instead finding that the commission’s 
comments showed hostility to religion.63  We can expect efforts to interpret
this ruling broadly—for example, anti-vaccine groups in New York tried 
to claim that the state legislature’s repeal of the religious exemption to its 
school immunization mandate was motivated by religious hostility.64  But
attempting to interpret a precedent broadly or narrowly is routine legal 
practice, and it is the role of courts to avoid broadening the decision in a 
way that would undermine any law that could have an impact on religion, 
to the point of overturning Smith or sacrificing the policies protected by 
it.  New York courts, so far, have rejected the effort to apply Masterpiece 
59. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (cert. granted); Fulton
v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/D88T-JS43] (describing 
the issues the case raises for the Court to consider).
60. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692, 736 (2014). Hobby
Lobby has been strongly criticized for its potentially harmful effect on contraceptive rights 
and discrimination.  See Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and 
Religious Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 63– 
64 (2015); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 92–95 (2015).  That, however, is somewhat beyond the scope of 
this specific Article. 
61. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693. 
62. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1723–24 (2018).
63. See id. at 1729–32. 
64. See F.F. ex rel. Y.F. v. New York, 108 N.Y.S.3d 761, 767–68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
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Cakeshop to a change of law that was motivated by public health, and we
can expect that to continue.65 
The general rule that a policy motivated by hostility to religion cannot
avoid scrutiny just by cloaking itself came out of Lukumi, shortly after 
Smith.66  There are good grounds to stop state policies that target religion,
because that is directly within the type of religious oppression the Free Exercise 
Clause was created to prevent.  That goal is not in tension with Smith. 
Since Masterpiece Cakeshop, there has been a change in the Supreme
Court’s composition. Justice Kennedy—who wrote the Masterpiece Cakeshop
opinion—retired in 2018, and Justice Brett Kavanaugh—who appears in 
favor of overturning Smith—replaced Justice Kennedy on the Court.67 
However, it is still not clear that there is a majority for overturning Smith 
on the Court; in the most recent decisions on point, the court seemed inclined 
to uphold Smith.68 The Court may preserve or limit Smith, perhaps following 
Justice Alito’s FOP approach;69 however, at this point, we cannot assume 
that. The most recent Supreme Court decision on the First Amendment— 
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, decided June 30, 2020— 
did not generally address Smith, since the situation in question was one 
where a state expressly refused a benefit to religious institutions, clearly 
treating religion differently.70  Further, while some of the concurrences— 
especially those by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch—suggested an 
inclination to depart from the Smith approach and broaden the connection 
between state and religion, the fact that those were separate concurrences 
suggests that there is no majority of the court endorsing those views.71 
Since Smith, a significant minority of states adopted a religious freedom 
restoration act (RFRA), which requires applying strict scrutiny when a 
65. See id. at 774–75. 
66. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–
35 (1993) (“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot 
be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”). 
67. See Dyan Matthews, America under Brett Kavanaugh, VOX (Oct 5, 2018, 3:50
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/11/17555974/brett-kavanaugh-anthony-kennedy-supreme-
court-transform [https://perma.cc/HRK6-WE95].
68. We discuss a recent Supreme Court decision about stay-at-home orders and 
churches below, see infra Part IV, because it fits better. 
 69. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
70. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251, 2255, 2260– 
63 (2020).
71. See id. at 2263–67 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2267–74 (Alito, J., concurring); 
id. at 2274–78 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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statute substantially burdens religion.72  If the Supreme Court overturns
Smith, or if a state adopts a RFRA, the applicable standard to any state order 
affecting religious establishments would decidedly be strict scrutiny. 
There are therefore at least two, possibly more, standards we need to 
consider. First, we need to address the existing Smith/Lukumi framework. 
However, since the existence of state RFRAs means that at least some
states will apply strict scrutiny, we will address that alternative as well—
and our discussion of it will also cover a situation in which the Supreme 
Court overturns Smith.
Under the Smith/Lukumi framework, the most important question for 
courts facing stay-at-home orders would be whether they are, in fact,
of general applicability and neutral on their face.73  If they are, a religious 
exemption is not required.74  If there are any indications of hostility to 
religion, strict scrutiny will apply.75  Under our analysis, just the existence
of other exceptions would not take us out of Smith, but if similar activities 
to religious ones are permitted while religious activities are not, the law 
may still violate the standard.
COVID-19 is potentially lethal and can cause severe disease in a substantial 
number of the cases, therefore states will likely have little trouble meeting 
the first prong of strict scrutiny, showing a compelling state interest.76 
Traditionally, controlling or preventing infectious diseases that cause
mortality and significant morbidity was found to be a compelling state 
interest.77  The challenge in withstanding strict scrutiny will be whether 
the order in question is the “least restrictive means” of achieving that 
interest.78  In that, the content of the order will matter substantially.  This
is reflected, in part, in the way courts have already approached existing 
orders. We turn to that now. 
72. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(May 4, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/E2HG-VLX2]. As of 2017, twenty-one states had them.  Id.
 73. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993) (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)). 
74. See id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 879). 
75. Id. at 533 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79). 
76. Reiss, supra note 58, at 238–39. 
77. Id. at 238; see also Brock v. Boozman, No. 4:01CV00760 SWW, 2002 WL 
1972086, at *8 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2002) (emphasizing that public health, in relation to 
the Hep. B vaccine, is an extremely important government interest, indicating that it would 
easily satisfy even strict scrutiny).  
78. See Reiss, supra note 58, at 238. 
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IV. STAY-AT-HOME AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM JURISPRUDENCE: 
THE IS AND THE SHOULD 
The cases across the nation vary.  As mentioned, we provide a detailed 
list of them in a separate spreadsheet, and do not think this paper requires 
that.79  Instead, we will try to map the cases here in broader strokes.
While these suits are widespread across the nation, and thus differ
depending on the text of the specific challenged order, the arguments are 
often similar.  The strongest and most consistent claim by challengers is
that the COVID-19 stay-at-home orders display a governmental distrust 
in places of worship to abide by social distancing and other public health 
guidelines, and that they treat these establishments worse than they treat
others.  Even the most general of orders will have exceptions for some 
activities deemed essential—and, while the specific facts and language of 
the orders mattered, individual judges also differed in the weight they gave to
the existence of such exceptions.  Below, we present a range of approaches 
by different courts in different situations.
The argument that exceptions make stay-at-home orders non-neutral 
prevailed in several cases.  Most problematically, Judge Broomes from 
the District Court in Kansas used it when granting a TRO against the Kansas 
order in First Baptist Church.80  The Kansas Governor’s challenged stay-
at-home order began with a general provision prohibiting mass gatherings 
—gatherings of more than ten—in “auditoriums, theaters, movie theaters, 
museums, stadiums, . . . and churches or other religious facilities.”81  There,
churches were just part of a long list.  The section that followed was specific 
to churches: 
With regard to churches or other religious services or activities, this order prohibits
gathering of more than ten congregants or parishioners in the same building or
confined or enclosed space. However, the number of individuals—such as preachers,
lay readers, choir or musical performers, or liturgists—conducting or performing
a religious service may exceed ten as long as those individuals follow appropriate
safety protocols, including maintaining a six-foot distance between individuals 
and following other directives regarding social distancing, hygiene, and other
efforts to slow the spread of COVID-19.82 
79. See Reiss & Thomas, supra note 33.
 80. See First Baptist Church v. Kelly, No. 20-1102-JWB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
68267, at *24–30 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2020). 
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The court ruled that this fit better within the legal framework set out in 
Lukumi than that of Smith. Judge Broomes said: 
In this case, EO 20-18 and EO 20-25 expressly purport to restrict in-person
religious assembly by more than ten congregants.  In that sense, they are not facially neutral.
Defendant asserts that despite the express restrictions imposed on religious assembly,
the laws are facially neutral because they apply as well to a much broader swath
of secular activity in addition to the overt limitations placed on church gatherings.
Nevertheless, while these executive orders begin with a broad prohibition against
mass gatherings, they proceed to carve out broad exemptions for a host of secular 
activities, many of which bear similarities to the sort of personal contact that will
occur during in-person religious services.  Lukumi indicates that a court should
evaluate these exemptions in assessing a law’s neutrality.83 
The Kansas order was explicitly designed to limit all large gatherings, 
for a specific public health purpose, and listed religious services as just
one of a broad range of activities to be limited.84  This situation is very, very
different from that at issue in Lukumi, where the City’s measures were clearly 
aimed at limiting the practices of a church belonging to the Santeria religion.85 
The mere mentioning of religion, among a long list of other secular activities,
all of which are characterized by large gatherings, does not entail that a given 
measure be classified as hostile to religion.  This is especially the case when
the order was the result of a real, objective public health emergency— 
something that did not exist in Lukumi.
If anything, the section specific to religious services can be read as
charitable to religion, as it creates an exception not offered to other types 
of gatherings. This seemingly better treatment for religion may raise questions
under the Establishment Clause—raising the specter of state over-involvement
in religion—but not under the Free Exercise Clause.  Analogizing the Kansas
order to the measures challenged in Lukumi, as similarly hostile to religion 
is, in our view, misapplying the jurisprudence or incorrectly characterizing
the facts.
Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear, where an injunction was granted
in part to the challenged Kentucky order, is more easily defensible.86 The
Kentucky orders prohibited mass gatherings, including for “faith-based” 
activities, but carved out “life-sustaining” exceptions in which some businesses 
—i.e., law firms, laundromats, liquor stores, and gun shops—were allowed 
to operate so long as they comply with social distancing guidelines.87 The 
83. First Baptist Church, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68267, at *17–18. 
84. See Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-18. 
85. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–
35, 538, 540–42 (1993). 
86. See Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614–15 (6th Cir.
2020).
87. See id. at 614. 
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Sixth Circuit found discrimination here because these “life-sustaining” 
exceptions “do not permit soul-sustaining group services of faith organizations, 
even if the groups adhere to all the public health guidelines required of 
essential services and even when they meet outdoors.”88 
This argument is much stronger.  “Faith-based” activities were clearly 
excluded from the list of exceptions that used the value-laden language
of “life-sustaining” activity.89  Whether religion should be considered 
“life-sustaining” is a charged question drawing on one’s values, and 
churches have a plausible argument that seeing a broad array of secular 
activities, including liquor and gun stores, as life-sustaining but not religious 
ones, and allowing the former but not the latter, involves a value judgment.  
We therefore agree with the Sixth Circuit that a law prohibiting drive-in 
religious services that follow social distancing requirements, but allowing 
other drive-in services like liquor stores, laundromats, and gun stores because 
they are “life sustaining” is not generally applicable, nor neutral on its face.  
Accordingly, the law does not fall under Smith, and is subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
Further, drive-through situations do not involve gatherings, and people
are not close together.  Unless a state can point to a meaningful difference
between the situations that make religious drive-throughs more risky than 
other drive-through situations, it has no good basis to treat them differently. 
Contrast that to the Binford v. Sununu order. 90 In upholding the New 
Hampshire Governor’s emergency order under both federal and state 
constitutional protections, the court held: 
As established above, Emergency Order #2 is content neutral.  Nothing in
Emergency Order #2 suggests that it is intended to target any religion or specific 
religious practice.  While a ban on scheduled gatherings of 50 or more people
may have an impact on the ability for a congregation to assemble at church, the Court
concludes that such an impact is merely incidental to the neutral regulation and is
otherwise reasonable given the limited duration of the order and public health
threat facing the citizens of this State.91 
We agree with the court.  General orders like the ones in New Hampshire,
passed in response to a documented public health emergency, cannot be 
reasonably seen as motivated by hostility to religion, and should thus be 
88. Id.
 89. See Ky. Exec. Order No. 2020-257 (Mar. 25, 2020). 
90. Binford v. Sununu, No. 217-2020-cv-00152, 2020 N.H. Super. LEXIS 20 (N.H. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020). 
91. Id. at *28. 
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examined under Smith and, given the deferential standard and the public 
health emergency, upheld.
The possibility that other judges may misapply Smith and Lukumi the 
way the court in First Baptist Church did is concerning, especially since
we are, again, seeing quite a few of these cases.92 
On May 29, 2020, the Supreme Court addressed the issue, rejecting an
injunctive relief against California Governor Newsom’s order limiting
church activities.93  The order—a revision of a previous, more restrictive 
order—limited attendance at “places of worship to 25% of building capacity 
or a maximum of 100 attendees.”94  The Supreme Court’s majority simply 
rejected the request for an injunction, but in a concurrence, Chief Justice 
Roberts found that the restrictions are 
consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Similar or 
more severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, 
concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where
large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.
And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as
operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate
in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.95 
In a dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh 
wrote that the state’s choice to allow some activities requires meeting a 
strict scrutiny standard when setting limits on religion.  Justice Kavanaugh 
stated:
[A]bsent a compelling justification (which the State has not offered), the State
may not take a looser approach with, say, supermarkets, restaurants, factories,
and offices while imposing stricter requirements on places of worship. [¶] The
State also has substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency. But as
relevant here, the Constitution imposes one key restriction on that line-drawing:
The State may not discriminate against religion.96 
We find Chief Justice Roberts’s argument more compelling.  California’s 
distinction was, in fact, between places where people gather closely for 
extended periods and places where people pass through.97  Towards places
of gathering, the state’s order was facially neutral, and should be approached 
as such. Without allowing states limiting gatherings to apply those limits 
to all gatherings, courts are requiring those states to put their populations 
92. See Reiss & Thomas, supra note 33. 
93. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (mem.).
94. Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
95. Id.
 96. Id. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
97. See id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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at risk. Limiting gatherings for gathering’s sake is not targeted at religion 
and should not be considered hostile. 
A. Take-Aways from the Jurisprudence 
Conclusions from the legal analysis above apply to two situations.  First,
states should be mindful of the legal limits in crafting orders that apply to
religious establishments; second, courts should approach orders crafted
during an emergency with a practical, realistic frame of mind. 
The goal of stay-at-home orders is to reduce the spread of COVID-19 
and its attendant harms—potential sickness, long-lasting effects, and deaths.  
As a first step, states should tailor the requirements to the need, and less
restrictive measures are better than more restrictive ones, even in a crisis.98 
In other words, if the concern is that large gatherings increase transmission, 
large gatherings should be limited, but smaller gatherings, or forms of 
gatherings that do not pose the same risk, can be allowed. An order that
prohibits gatherings of “more than fifty people” or limits gatherings to a 
number that allows for “social distancing between members of different
households,” and applies this to any type of gathering, is more directly 
aimed at that goal and less restrictive than a complete ban on any gathering 
of any size.  An order that allows gatherings via drive-through, when people
stay in cars, but limits in-person gathering by size, is more likely to be upheld
than an order that also prohibits drive-in.  And this order allows for consistency
across diverse types of gathering. Note that these recommendations are
relevant whether a Smith framework is used or a strict scrutiny one: for 
Smith, a general framework helps uphold an order, and a more tailored
approach makes the order more reasonable.  Under strict scrutiny, closer
tailoring can help meet the least restrictive means requirement.99  This
approach also fits what seems to have been behind the majority in South 
Bay United Pentecostal Church—and was clearly at the basis of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s concurrence. 100 
In a Smith jurisdiction, grouping activities by level of risk—rather than
comparing secular and religious venues or practices—can more clearly
signal that the rules are not targeting religion. A focus on “any gathering
over fifty people” is general, and goes directly to the heart of a factor 
98. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Public Health Law and Science in the Community Mitigation 
Strategy for Covid-19, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 7, 19 (2020). 
99. See Reiss, supra note 58, at 238. 
100. See S. Bay Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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that increases risk: higher numbers of people.  A focus on indoor versus 
outdoor activities similarly addresses a risk factor, as we know that the 
virus spreads more easily in closed, indoor environments.101 
In a serious outbreak of COVID-19, prohibitions on any size of gatherings 
may be justified.  In those cases, again, a general rule prohibiting large, 
indoor gatherings is better than spelling out specific types of gatherings. 
And exceptions should be considered by type.  Allowing services that do 
not require long exposure to other people, while prohibiting situations
where people are in close contact for long period of times, draws relevant 
lines, and these are situations courts are more likely to uphold.102 
The reality is that in an emergency situation, orders will not always be 
carefully written.  An easy way for states to avoid closer scrutiny under 
Smith is, as mentioned, to be more general in their orders: not to mention 
religious services, but to simply ban gatherings of ten or more without 
specificity or qualifiers, such as “life-sustaining,” that will be more vulnerable 
to value judgments.103  That being said, to have judicial decisions stand or
fall on careful writing alone is not a good policy result.  And general orders 
also have their drawbacks.  More information as to what is covered is 
helpful to the public.  States should not get the message that providing less 
information or being more vague will make their executive orders more 
judgment-proof, but that is exactly the message that literal adherence to 
Smith sends.  We believe courts should acknowledge that general stay-
at-home orders are valid, even if they mention religious services as part 
of a long list of other areas subject to limits, as long as the basis for the 
limit is not religious: just like prohibiting peyote by Oregon’s controlled 
substances act did not make the law in question in Smith less neutral, even 
though peyote is used for religious ceremonies.104  Mentioning religion in
a long list of gatherings does not make stay-at-home orders less neutral, 
nor does it entail hostility to religion.  When religious ceremonies are included 
in that group as an also run—just part of a list of activities that are 
characterized by gatherings—the measure is not targeting religion, and it 
should be examined under Smith and upheld as neutral. 
A different situation exists when states do, indeed, pass orders specific
to churches: those will be subject to strict scrutiny.  The decisions in Maryville 
Baptist Church and in On Fire Christian Center v. Fischer (On Fire),
addressing orders—city and state—allowing drive-through liquor services, 
101. See Hernandez, Toy & McKay, supra note 30. 
102. See Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and 
the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 
189, 191, 207–08 (2020). 
103. See Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614, 616 (6th Cir. 2020). 
104. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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but not drive-through religious services, are good examples.105  While On 
Fire problematically reflects a judge’s religious point of view, which is 
troubling in a country whose constitution requires separation of church and 
state,106 it correctly reflects the law.  Laws that single out religion—those 
that are specific to religious events—do need to meet strict scrutiny.107 
The question is whether a specific restriction would be the least restrictive
means of achieving the designated state interest.108  To this end, we think
the judge in On Fire was right to consider the mayor of Louisville’s order 
in On Fire problematic. The order completely prohibited drive-through 
religious services109—which could be conducted in a manner that works
with social distancing—while permitting drive-throughs for other activities.  
A less restrictive means would impose rules that provide for social distancing 
while allowing drive-through services to continue. 
105. See Maryville Baptist Church, 957 F.3d at 611–12, 614; On Fire Christian Ctr. 
v. Fischer, No. 3:20-CV-264-JRW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65924, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 
11, 2020). 
106. For example, the decision ends with the following, highly religious paragraphs: 
The Christians of On Fire, however, owe no one an explanation for why they
will gather together this Easter Sunday to celebrate what they believe to be
a miracle and a mystery.  True, they can attempt to explain it.  True, they can try
to teach.  But to the nonbeliever, the Passion of Jesus—the betrayals, the torture, 
the state-sponsored murder of God’s only Son, and the empty tomb on the third 
day—makes no sense at all.  And even to the believer, or at least to some of them, it
can be incomprehensible as well.
But for the men and women of On Fire, Christ’s sacrifice isn’t about the 
logic of this world.  Nor is their Easter Sunday celebration.  The reason they will 
be there for each other and their Lord is the reason they believe He was and is
there for us.  For them, for all believers, “it isn’t a matter of reason; finally, it’s 
a matter of love.”
On Fire Christian Ctr., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65924, at *22–23 (quoting ROBERT BOLT,
A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 88 (2013)).  That language, and the personal devotion to religion
it reflects, is certainly within the rights of a private individual, but is not part of the law of
the land and including it in a judicial decision is troubling. 
107. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
546–47 (1993).
108. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
(requiring a showing that a burdensome regulation represents “the least restrictive means 
of achieving some compelling state interest”). 
109. See On Fire Christian Ctr., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65924, at *12 (discussing 
how Louisville “targeted religious worship by prohibiting drive-in church services”). 
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V. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND STAY-AT-HOME ORDERS
Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”110  The clause 
embodies the idea of separation of church and state, though its meaning is 
conflicted and subject to extensive debate.111  As currently applied by the
Supreme Court, it is relatively clear that states—or the federal government 
—cannot treat different religions differently without facing strict scrutiny.112 
Less clear is what states can do that affects religious establishments.113 
Under the traditional Lemon test, laws affecting religion have to have a 
secular purpose, cannot have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion, and cannot involve excessive entanglement of government and 
religion.114  In 2019 a plurality of the Supreme Court expressed reservations
about the Lemon test, suggesting it does not achieve its purpose, but the 
Court did not provide an alternative approach.115  That said, American Legion
v. American Humanist Association reinforced the reality that the application 
of the Lemon test by the Supreme Court is, at best, confusing.116  That 
confusion was also reflected in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue,  
where the question of whether a constitutional provision forbidding state 
aid to religious schools was examined under the Free Exercise Clause but 
put aside for Establishment Clause purposes.117 
Relevant to this Article, several state stay-at-home orders exempt religious 
organizations from the restrictions imposed on other gathering.118  It is not 
clear if this is the result of personal support for religion, a view that most 
constituents support religion, or a misunderstanding of the constitutional 
110. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
 111. See William J. Cornelius, Church and State—The Mandate of the Establishment 
Clause: Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 6–8 (1984). 
112. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). 
113. See Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter
Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1173–74 (2006). 
114. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
115. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080–82, 2087–89
(2019). 
116. See id.; see also Cornelius, supra note 111, at 6–8; Alembik, supra note 113, at 
1188–92. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708–11 (1985) 
(finding that a Connecticut statute that provided employees an absolute right not to work 
on their Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause), with Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1986) 
(finding that exempting religious organizations from the anti-discrimination provisions of 
Title VII is constitutional). 
117. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t. of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251, 2254 (2020). 
118. See Madeline Holcombe & Stephanie Gallman, Here’s A Look at What States 
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jurisprudence as requiring an exception for religions.  A statement by the 
Governor of Florida suggested the latter.  Speaking to the press, Governor 
DeSantis indicated “that local authorities actually can in fact enforce 
stricter rules (like closing a park for jogging), but not when it comes to 
churches.”119  The Governor further remarked, “Look, I don’t think that
the government has the authority to close a church.”120 
As discussed above, this is not a good reflection of Smith.  But the reality 
is that several states have exempted churches from stay-at-home orders. 
The question is whether the law supports them in doing that.
Religious exemptions from various laws, while not required under Smith, 
do exist in all states. One example is the fact that most states provide a 
nonmedical exemption from school immunization mandates, and the majority
of these states explicitly offer religious exemptions.121  That said, there are
at least some scholars who believe religious exemptions violate the Lemon 
test.122 One court—Mississippi’s Supreme Court—found a religious exemption
to violate equal protection, finding that it discriminates against families 
without religious views, who do not receive a waiver of the requirement.123 
No other court, however, has followed the Mississippi’s Supreme Court’s 
lead.124 And courts have upheld laws exempting religions from requirements 
that apply to others, as discussed.125 
Strict application of the Lemon test may lead to striking down stay-
at-home orders that expressly exempt religious establishments, because
such an exemption would fail the first requirement of a secular purpose.126 
119. Colin Wolf, Orlando Lawyer for Pastor Who Held Services During Coronavirus





121. See States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunity 
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/BH4R-
UGFL].
122. See, e.g., Alicia Novak, Comment, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to
State-Compelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1101, 1115–16 (2005). 
123.  Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979). 
124. Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Programs
Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 90–91 (2011). 
125. Cornelius, supra note 111, at 6–10; Alembik, supra note 113, at 1180–81. 
126. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 
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However, as the Court summarized in American Legion, a similar claim 
could be made about opening legislative sessions with prayer—the purpose
is clearly religious—and nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the practice 
as constitutional.127  The Court described the upholding of the practice of 
prayer in the legislature as 
an example of respect and tolerance for differing views, an honest endeavor to
achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and a recognition of the important role 
that religion plays in the lives of many Americans. Where categories of monuments,
symbols, and practices with a longstanding history follow in that tradition, they
are likewise constitutional.128 
Some of these arguments would apply in support of exempting churches 
from stay-at-home orders, and some would work against it.  COVID-19 is 
a new disease, but diseases of this sort—those leading to closures—are not
new.  To give one example, the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic did lead to
closures of religious establishments, providing a precedent that goes against 
the churches here—suggesting the longstanding history may go the other
way.129  Inclusivity and nondiscrimination could work either way, because
exempting religion would have to apply to all religions, but would not apply 
to non-religion community centers holding symbolic events.  Exempting 
religion would certainly fit into acknowledging the importance of religion 
in the lives of many Americans.130  In short, under the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in the legislature case, it is unclear that these exemptions would 
stand. The American Legion plurality has not offered a clearer case. 
The argument that religious establishments serve a secular purpose of 
offering emotional and spiritual support during a serious crisis could also 
be attempted. However, if that is the argument, it is unclear why religious 
establishments should be treated differently than other sources of comfort
—for example, fitness establishments that allow exercise, because exercise
can offer emotional benefits.131 
127. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087–89 (2019).
128. Id. at 2089. 
129. Miles Ott et al., Lessons Learned from the 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic
in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 803, 804 (2007), https:// 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1997248/pdf/phr122000803.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2ZYF-XTJB]; see Richard J. Hatchett, Carter E. Mecher & Marc Lipsitch, Public Health 
Interventions and Epidemic Intensity During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic, 104 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 7582, 7582–84, 7586 (2007); Nina Strochlic & Riley D. Champine, How 
Some Cities ‘Flattened the Curve’ During the 1918 Flu Pandemic, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/03/how-cities-flattened-
curve-1918-spanish-flu-pandemic-coronavirus/#close [https://perma.cc/7HB5-APXY].
130. This approach would also fit Cornelius’s suggestion of benign neutrality towards
religion.  See Cornelius, supra note 111, at 35–37. 
131. See, e.g., LOUISE J. GENEEN ET AL.,PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND EXERCISE FOR CHRONIC 
PAIN IN ADULTS: AN OVERVIEW OF COCHRANE REVIEWS (2017), https://www.cochrane 
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This is a place where the recent jurisprudence suggesting sympathy to 
claims of religious discrimination may matter.  Indeed, it would be hard 
to reconcile Hobby Lobby—requiring that employers with religious objections 
to contraceptives be exempt from covering contraceptives for employees— 
with prohibiting religious exemptions for churches from stay-at-home 
orders.132  At the least, the plurality approach in American Legion suggests
that the Supreme Court is leaning to a flexible test that allows some 
religiously-motivated activity by state actors.  The Supreme Court upholding 
the distribution of legal aid to religious schools in Espinoza v. Montana 
Department of Revenue also fits this approach.133 
Our view is that there is enough precedent for religious exemptions, and 
enough cases allowing religious exemptions, to suggest that states providing
exceptions from stay-at-home orders to religious establishments are on
constitutionally sound grounds doing it and unlikely to have their exceptions
overturned. There is, however, a chance some judges will go the other
way and find that such exceptions violate the Establishment Clause and
the separation of church and state.134 
VI. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic tests states and countries in many ways.  It
also poses legal challenges for the United States.  This Article points out 
that the jurisprudence on the First Amendment is confusing, but that 
reasonable restrictions on gatherings are a reasonable response to the 
pandemic that can also apply to religious gatherings—within limits, and
as long as they do not negatively single out religious establishments.  That 
library.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD011279.pub3/epdf/full [https://perma.cc/
Y9AS-XEYZ]; Emily E. Bernstein & Richard J. McNally, Acute Aerobic Exercise Helps 
Overcome Emotion Regulation Deficits, 31 COGNITION & EMOTION 834, 839 (2017);
Emily E. Bernstein & Richard J. McNally, Exercise as a Buffer Against Difficulties with
Emotion Regulation: A Pathway to Emotional Wellbeing, 109 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY
29, 29, 33–34 (2018); Meghan K. Edwards, Ryan E. Rhodes & Paul D. Loprinzi, A 
Randomized Control Intervention Investigating the Effects of Acute Exercise on Emotional 
Regulation, 41 AM. J. HEALTH BEHAV. 534, 541 (2017); Brett R. Gordon et al., Association 
of Efficacy of Resistance Exercise Training with Depressive Symptoms, 75 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N PSYCHIATRY 566, 566, 571, 574 (2018); Darren E.R. Warburton & Shannon S.D.
Bredin, Health Benefits of Physical Activity: A Systematic Review of Current Systematic
Reviews, 32 CURRENT OPINION CARDIOLOGY 541 (2017).
132. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 692 (2014). 
133. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262–63 (2020). 
134. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979). 
 971










is not to say that all judges will arrive at the correct result on this issue,
but it is where courts should end. The Article also warns states that do
negatively single out religious establishments correctly face a higher bar.
We also point out that governors do not have to exempt religious
establishments from stay-at-home orders, and we believe that it is risky 
and bad policy to do so—given the several large COVID-19 outbreaks centered
on churches—but that they are unlikely to have exemptions overturned. 
We all face a lot of uncertainty about the coming years.  Where possible,
we should at least reduce uncertainty in the law. 
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